ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The rapid progress of networks facilitates more and more computers connecting together to exchange great information and share system resources. Password authentication with smart card is one of the most convenient and effective authentication mechanisms for remote systems to assure one communicating party of the legitimacy of the corresponding party by acquisition of corroborative evidence. This technique has been widely deployed for various kinds of authentication applications, such as remote login, online banking, e-commerce and e-health [1] [2] [3] . Since Lamport proposed the first remote authentication scheme based on the passwords, a series of authentication schemes have been proposed to improve system security and computation efficiency [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Lamport's scheme is based on a password table maintained by a server, which suffers not only from password attacks but also suffers from the cost of protecting and maintaining the password table [5] . To enhance the security of the password based authentication scheme, Chang and Wu introduced password and smart card based two factor user authentication scheme [6] . The main drawback of Chang and Wu's scheme is using static identity that publicly transmitted identity will reveal user privacy. To conquer the issue, Das et al. proposed an authentication scheme using dynamic identity [7] . However, Liao et al. showed that Das et al.'s scheme cannot resist user impersonation attack and also proposed an improved scheme with mutual authentication [8] .
In 2009, Xu et al. proposed a novel user authentication and claimed that their scheme is secure against various attacks [9] . However, Song and Sood et al. found that Xu et al.'s scheme has some weaknesses and proposed improved schemes [5, 10] . Subsequently, Chen et [12] . Unfortunately, Liu et al. showed that there are weaknesses in Li et al.'s scheme, such as from a man-in-the-middle attack and an insider attack and proposed a remedy scheme [13] .
Hence, the purpose of this paper is to provide cryptanalysis on Liu et al.'s scheme and proposes a new privacy preserving user authentication scheme based on smart card, denoted PUAS. First of all, we will show Liu et al.'s scheme is weak against off-line password guessing attack and masquerading attack, and does not provide perfect forward secrecy and anonymity. To solve the weaknesses in Liu et al.'s scheme, PUAS adopts dynamic identity and bilinear pairing, which could provide privacy. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Liu et al.'s smart card based password authentication scheme. In Section 3, security weaknesses will be shown against Liu et al.'s authentication scheme. A new privacy preserving user authentication scheme is proposed in Section 4 with the security and performance analyses at Section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper.
REVIEW OF LIU ET AL.'S AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Liu et al. proposed a smart card based password authentication scheme, which is consisted of four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication phaseand password change phase [13] . Liu et al. argued that their scheme can achieve mutual authentication and users can freely choose and change their passwords. This section reviews Liu et al.'s scheme briefly. Table 1 shows definition of notations used in this paper. 
Registration Phase
Before starting Liu et al.'s authentication scheme, the server S selects the master secret key x and a one-way hash function h(·). The registration phase is as follows:
Step 1. The user U i selects his/her identity ID i , password PW i , and a random number r, and then computes h(r||PW i ).U i submits {ID i ,h(r||PW i )}to S for registration over a secure channel.
Step 2. S computes A i =h(ID i ⊕x)||h(x),B i =A i ⊕h(r||PW i ) and C i =h(A i ||ID i ||h(r||PW i )).
Step 3. S stores the data {B i , C i , h(·)} on a new smart card (SC) and issues it to U i over a securechannel.
Step 4. U i stores the random number r into SC.
Login Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U i wants to login to S. The steps of this phase are shown as follows:
Step 1. U i inserts his/her SCinto a card reader and inputs ID i and PW i .
Step Step 3. SC randomly selects a number αand computes D i =h(ID i ⊕α)and E i =A i ′⊕α⊕T i , where T i is the current timestamp of U i .
Step 4. SCsends the login request message
Authentication Phase
After completing this phase, U i and S can mutually authenticate each other and establish a shared session key for the subsequent secret communication.
Step 1. S verifies whether ID i is valid and T i ′ − T i ≤∆T,where T i ′ is the time of receiving the login request message and ∆T is a valid time threshold. If both conditions are true, S continues to execute Step 2; otherwise, S rejects the login request.
Step 2. S computes
If theyare equal, S confirms that U i is valid and the login request is accepted; otherwise, the login request is rejected.
Step 3. S randomly selects a number β and computes F i =h(ID i ⊕β) and G i =A i ⊕β⊕T s .
Step 4. S sends the mutual authentication message
Step 5. Upon receiving the message
where T s ′ is time of receiving the mutual authentication message, SCcontinues to perform
Step 6; otherwise, SC terminates this connection.
Step 6. SCcomputes β′=G i ⊕A i ⊕T s andF i ′=h(ID i ⊕β′)and then checks whether F i ′ equals F i . If they are equal, the validity of S is authenticated; otherwise, the session is terminated.
Step 7. U i and S construct a shared session key sk=h(α||β′||h(
Password Change Phase
Liu et al.'s protocol allows users to freely update their passwords. The password change phase works as follows:
Step 1. U i inserts his/her SCinto a card reader,enters his/her old identity ID i and password PW i , andrequests to change the password.
Step 
SECURITY WEAKNESS OF LIU ET AL.'S AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
This section provides security weaknesses in Liu et al.'s authentication scheme, which are focused on off-line password guessing attack (OPGA), masquerading attack (MA) with smart card loss attack, no perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and no anonymity.
Off-line Password Guessing Attack
Kocher et al. explained that various information stored in SCs could be extracted by physically monitoring its power consumption [14] . So it is possible to say that if a user loses his/her SC, all information in SCmay be revealed to the attacker. In Liu et al.'s authentication scheme, SC stores important information for user login and authentication phases. Furthermore, for the proper attack, it is assumed that the attacker could listen and get the messages from the communication between U i and S. 
The attacker checks whether C i ′ is equal to C i . If they are the same, the password guessing is successful. Otherwise, the attacker repeats Steps (1) and (2) until the correct password is withdrawn.
Masquerading Attack
When an attacker gets or steals the user's SCin OPGA, he/she can login and authenticate to S, and compute the session key sk between U i and S. So the attacker can impersonate the legitimate user U i . It is critical problem that the attacker can be authenticated to S using user's SCinformation. The attacker can illegally extract the secret values in the user's SC and get some important information.
So, the attacker impersonate U i after the success of OPGA as follows. (1) 
No Perfect Forward Secrecy
PFS is a feature of specific key agreement schemes that gives assurances the session key will not be compromised even if the private key of the server is compromised. But Liu et al.'s scheme does not achieve PFS.
In Liu et al.'s scheme, the attacker can compute the all session keys between U i and S if the attacker knows one of long-term keys as follows. (1) 
No Anonymity
Liu et al.'s authentication scheme does not provide the anonymity. In this scheme, U i sends his/her own identifier ID i to S over public communication without any protection. Therefore, an attacker can easily get ID i from public communications. This results in the identity exposure problem. Therefore, the lack of anonymity in Liu et al.'s scheme raises privacy related problems that need to be addressed to Internet of things. To solve this problem, it is necessary to use anonymity mechanism in the communication.
PRIVACY PRESERVING USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
In this section, we propose a new privacy preserving user authentication scheme (PUAS) based on smartcard and bilinear pairing. PUAS could solve all the security problems and privacy issue depicted in Liu et al.'s authentication scheme. In PUAS, there are also two participants, U i and S, which is consisted of four phases, registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password changing phase.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group generated by P whose order is a prime q, and G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. A map ê(.) : G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 is called a bilinear mapping if it satisfies the following properties:
-Bilinear property: ê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab , for all Pand Q in G 1 and all a and b in Z q * . -Non-degenerate: There exists P and Q in G 1 such that ê(P, Q)=1. -Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for all P and Q inG 1 .
We note that G 1 is the group of points on an elliptic curve and G 2 is a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field. Typically, the mapping ê will be derived from either the Weil or the Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
PUAS
This section proposes a new privacy preserving user authentication scheme to solve the security and privacy problems in Liu et al.'s scheme, which provides mutual authentication between the user and the server and does not require time synchronization. In order to prevent the problems of clock synchronization or a delay-time limitations, PUAS adopts the challenge-response mechanism. The security of PUAS is based on bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP) and onewayness of the hash function.
For the system setup, system administrator sets a Bilinear map ê(.) and h(·) :{0,1} * →G 1 , which is a cryptographic hash function with an output size of 512 bits. Furthermore, system administrator selects encryption and decryption function, E(·) and D(·), based on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Then, the system administrator publishes the system parameters <G 1 , G 2 
, ê(.), q, P, h(·), E(·), D(·)>.
PUAS consists of four phases namely; registration, login, authentication and password change phases as shown in Figures 1 and 2. [Registration Phase] This phase is executed by the following steps when a new user U i wants to be registered to the serverS. After the mutual authentication and session key agreement between U i and S, they could securely communicate with each other based on the established SK.
RP1. When
[Password Change Phase]This phase is invoked whenever U i wants to change his/her password. By invoking this phase, U i can easily change his/her password without taking any assistance from S. If U i wants to change his/her password, U i inserts SC in a card reader and inputs ID i ′ and PW i ′. Then, SC performs the following operations: 
ANALYSIS
This section provides security and performance analyses of PUAS. For the security analysis, three security properties of PUAS are considered mainly to show security against OPGA and MA with smart card loss attack, and provide PFS. Furthermore, PUAS provides anonymity. After that, we provide performance analysis of PUAS and comparison with the related schemes in [12] [13] .
Security Analysis
For the proper security analysis, we follow the Dolev-Yao threat model [15] and consider the risk of side-channel attack [14] to construct the threat assumptions which are described as follows: -An adversary can be either U i or S. Any registered user can act as an adversary.
-An adversary can eaves drop every communication in public channels. He/she can capture any message exchanged between U i and S.
-An adversary has the ability to alter, delete or reroute the captured message. -Information can be extracted from the smart card by examining the power consumption of the card.
[Off-line Password Guessing Attack]Suppose an user loses his/her smart card and an adversary gets it, and extracts all of the information stored on the smart card {B i , C i , D i , P i , ê(.), h(.), P} by power consumption analysis. However, he/she cannot obtain any password related information. There are three values B i , D i and P i related to the password. Each value is related with two unknown values to the attacker. Therefore, PUAS is strong against OPGA because the attacker could not do any guessing attack due to two unknown values in each value. For U i MA, the attacker need to form a legal login message {C i , E i , F i }. However, the attacker could not form a legal value F i due to the lack of knowledge on A i , which is related with the password guessing attack. For SMA, the attacker need to form a message {L i , C i ′, M i }. However, the attacker could not form a legal value M i due to the lack of knowledge on A i and C i ′, which are related to the long term secret x of S. Therefore, PUAS is strong against MA.
[Perfect Forward Secrecy] The security of PUAS is based on the bilinear pairing. In PUAS, a session key is computed between U i and Sas SK=ê(α, βP)=ê(αP, β). Even if S's long term secret key x is compromised, the adversary cannot retrieve α nor β from E i and L i to generate the session key. The session key of PUAS is based on the difficulty of BDHP. Thereby, PUAS provides PFS.
[Anonymity] To address anonymity, PUAS uses C i , which is an amplified encrypted identity and is regularly changed in each session. Only S could generate and check the identity of U i by using the long term secret key x. Furthermore, the renewal of is not only depending on x but also depending on the session key SK. Thereby, only legal entity could know the amplified identity E x (ID i ||β). Thereby, PUAS provides anonymity. 
Performance Analysis
This subsection evaluates the performance of PUAS in terms of computational cost. Table 3 shows a comparison of PUAS and the related schemes [12] [13] . From Table 3 , we can see that PUAS has a bit overhead than the other schemes to provide security and privacy. The security and privacy are top most important in any cryptographic schemes. For the efficient comparison, we only considered login and authentication phases' operational requirements with the notations M, E, B, S and H for multiplication/division operation, modulus exponential operation, bilinear pairing operation, symmetric encryption/decryption operation and hash operation, respectively. Table 3 . Performance comparison of user authentication schemes.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided analyses on Liu et al.'s smart card based password authentication scheme. Our research showed that Liu et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the password guessing attack and impersonation attack and furthermore does not provide perfect forward secrecy not anonymity. As a remedy scheme of Liu et al.'s scheme, we proposed a privacy preserving user authentication scheme (PUAS) based on smart card. We demonstrated that PUAS has much better security features and performance when compared to Liu et al.'s scheme and the related other schemes.
